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Abstract 
Banknotes carry traces from both histories and policies of states. This study deals with the banknotes 
issued in 1980 to today and claims that these banknotes have had political messages. In this respect, 
Turkish-Islamic Synthesis and its symbolization of banknotes is the main point of this study. Turkish-
Islamic Synthesis emerged in the 1960s and evolved to a state policy after the military coup in 1980. It still 
exists under AKP rule in the 2000s. This maintenance can be traced in design of the banknotes, which 
issued during military coup period and continued during AKP rule.  
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PARA KONUŞUR: BANKNOTLARDA TÜRK İSLAM SENTEZİ 
Öz 
Banknotlar, tasarımları ve üzerlerinde taşıdıkları semboller ile hem ülkelerin tarihine dair izler 
taşımaktadırlar hem de bu ülkelerin uyguladıkları politikalara dair ipucu vermektedirler. Bu çalışma, 
1980 yılından günümüze kadar Türkiye’de basılmış olan banknotları ele almaktadır ve bu banknotların 
siyasal bir mesaj taşıdıkları iddiasını savunmaktadır. Bu bağlamda, Türk-İslam Sentezi’nin banknotlar 
üzerinde sembolleşmesi bu çalışmanın temel argümanıdır. Kökleri 1960’lı yıllara uzanan ve 1980 
yılındaki askeri darbe ile bir devlet politikası olarak uygulanmaya başlanan Türk-İslam Sentezi, 2000’li 
yıllarda da AKP Hükümetleri ile devam etmektedir. Bu devamlılığı, askeri yönetim sırasında kullanılan 
ve AKP Dönemi’nde basılmaya başlanan banknotlar üzerindeki sembollerde görmek mümkündür. 
Anahtar Terimler 
Türk-İslam sentezi, milli kimlik, dini kimlik, banknotlar, AKP. 
 
Introduction  
In the last decade, it is argued that there is a struggle between those who would like to 
see Turkey more aligned with the Islamic world and those who want it to remain more 
secular and ‘Western’ (Friedman, 2010 cited in Orhan, 2013, p. 28). In relation to this 
argument, a debate on national identity -whether it is based on nationalism or religion- 
emerges. As Waxman (2000, p. 2) asks:  
Do Turks see themselves as members of the West or East? As Europeans or 
Middle Eastemers?  As Turks first, or Muslims first? What place does 
religion and ethnicity have in Turkish national identity? 
It may be said that roots and answers of this debate have its origins in the past century. 
According to this debate, there is a historical contradiction between nationalism and 
religion. Moreover, Islam and nationalism are not reconcilable issues in terms of 
political and social levels (Grigoriadis, 2013, p. 71). These two concepts are argued of 
being incompatible. Especially after secular politics of the early Republican Period, 
religion has been perceived as the cause of backwardness and as an obstacle for 
Westernization. Thus, it is claimed that religion is excluded from both political and 
social spheres of life. However, there is no distinct contradiction between religion and 
nationalism. Despite the claims that rise of one is decline of the other, relationship 
between Islam and nationalism is not a zero sum game. On the contrary, there is a 
dynamic interaction between them. There is a dual process involving the Islamization of 
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Turkish nationalism, and the nationalization of Islam (Waxman, 2000, p. 5). From the 
late 1860s until today, religion has become a significant component of nationalism and 
national identity in Turkey. Gökhan Çetinsaya (1999, p. 351) explains the interaction 
with a threefold sense: 
One is Turkishness and Islam has been closely linked from the very 
beginning throughout the evolution of Turkish nationalism and modernist 
Islam. Second is that who rejected Islam among the Turkists and that who 
rejected nationalism among the Islamists were the exceptions and did not 
present the majority. Third is that people, who adapt Turkish-Islamic 
Synthesis among the Islamists and Turkists in present day Turkey, are 
influenced by same resources published between the 1950s and the 1970s.  
When the 1970s and the 1980s came, interaction between religion and nationalism 
became a de facto state policy, which is called as Turkish-Islamic Synthesis (TIS), and it 
lasts up to today under Justice and Development Party (AKP) rule.  
In the conjuncture of Cold War politics, TIS aimed to create a national identity 
based on ethnicity and religion against the rising left (Yavuz, 2003, 38). According to 
Orhan (2013, p. 32), this acquired overtones of religious nationalism, a blending of 
ethnic (Turk) and religious (Sunni Islam).  
It is such a significant issue that this synthesis influenced not only the political 
and social life but also the symbols used in daily life. Banknotes, as one of the most used 
symbolic instruments in daily life, involves traces of political transitions and state 
policies. 
In this article, continuity of interaction between religion and nationalism will be 
studied. While doing this, TIS and the banknotes used during the years of military coup 
in 1980 and the banknotes issued during AKP rule in 2009 will be the focal points. In 
this respect, this study will be composed of three parts. In the first part, TIS will be 
explained, the emergence and roots of this project will be tackled.  In the second part, 
continuity of TIS since military coup in 1980 to AKP years in the 2000s will be analyzed. 
In this part, influence of synthesis in relation to political parties will be discussed. In the 
last part, roles of banknotes as instruments of political transition and state policies will 
be discussed. Banknotes used in the early 1980s and banknotes issued in 2009, when the 
AKP consolidated its power, will be analyzed with reference to TIS. 
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Turkish Islamic Synthesis  
Strengthening of Islam in Turkish politics was partly a consequence of changes in the 
international system, and, related to this, Turkish right deemed Islam as an asset to tap 
into after the dawn of the Cold War and the looming of communism (Aslan, 2014, p. 
523). Rise of leftist movements was perceived as a threat to sovereignty, national 
identity and territorial integrity of Turkey, and this resulted in seizing of power by the 
Turkish Army in 1980. The policies of military government about the national identity 
was based on the convergence of Turkish nationalism and Islam, which were 
crystallized in the concept of TIS (Orhan, 2013, p. 40). 1,2 
                                                     
1 There are contributions that claim ‘Turkish-Islam Synthesis’ formed after the military coup in 1980 represents a 
radical departure from Kemalist secularism, but it will not be analyzed in this article. For more information, see Banu 
Eligür, The Mobilization of Political Islam in Turkey, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 2010, and Yıldız Atasoy, 
Islam’s Marriage with Neoliberalism: State Transformation in Turkey, Palgrave Macmillan: London, 2009. 
2 It is also claimed that Turkish-Islamic Synthesis aimed to diminish influence of non-Turkish Islamic movements 
from Iran, Pakistan and Arab World. In addition, it was aimed to counter Islamic revolutionary ideas originating 
from Iranian Revolution. 
It was originally formulated by right-wing intellectuals including İsmail Dayı, 
Necmettin Erbakan and Agah Oktay Güner, who were members of the Thinkers Club 
(Aydınlar Kulübü) (Atasoy, 2009, p. 94). Then, this club was converted to The Hearth of 
the Enlightened (Aydınlar Ocağı) which was formed in 1970 (Waxman, 2000, p. 18). 
Concerned of increasing influence of leftist movements, right-wing intellectuals 
highlighted a religion-inspired nationalism. Religion was defined as the core principle 
of social and cultural life. It was İbrahim Kafesoğlu, who ideologized interrelation of 
religion, nationalism and modernity within Turkish context. In this regard, Islam was 
defined as the most suitable religion for Turks and the TIS as a component of national 
identity.  
Bearing in mind that universities were the center of leftist movements, education 
was defined as the core of TIS. Governments formed through leading of military 
regime, referred to religion and religious education as unifying factors to consolidate 
the nation. In this point, it should be noted that religious education was formed and 
controlled by the state. It was the ‘official Islam’, rather than the fundamentalist or 
reactionary ones (Waxman, 2000, p. 19).  In this regard, Çetinsaya (1999, p. 370) points 
out two factors that helped to evolution of TIS: İmam-Hatip schools and Ülkücü 
(nationalist) movement. 
Established in 1951, İmam-Hatip schools were formed by the state to train and 
educate imams and preachers. The Islamic foundations have played a crucial part in the 
operation of these schools by providing scholarships, running residence halls and clubs, 
publishing books and the like (Zubeida, 1996). Number of these schools increased 
tremendously from the late 1960s to the early 1990s (Zubeida, 1996). A typical imam-
hatip student read Mehmet Akif, Ziya Gökalp, Yahya Kemal, Necip Fazıl and Peyami 
Safa, apart from standard religious and other textbooks (Çetinsaya, 1999, p. 370). 
Playing a crucial role in evolution of TIS, many leading figures in Turkey were 
graduates of imam-hatip schools including National View Movement and AKP (Şen, 
2011, p. 64).  
Established by Alpaslan Türkeş, an army officer and leader of Nationalist Action 
Party, in 1968 against increasing impact of leftist-communist political movements, 
Ülkücü Movement aims to reconciliate Islam and Turkishness. As it was declared in the 
slogan of nationalists, ‘Turkish as Mount Tanrı and Muslim as Mount Hira’,3 Ülkücü 
                                                     
3 In pre-Islamic Turkish mythology, Mount Tanrı is defined as the place, where Turks expanded to the world. Mount 
Hira is believed as the place, where Prophet Mohammad received first revelations from God.  
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Movement aims to formulate national identity through Turkishness and Islam, both 
with the pre-Islamic and Islamic memories of the nation (Uzer, 2011, p. 51). Due to the 
influence of leftist movements, it is clear that campaigns and ideas of nationalist parties 
have changed. Islam became one of the core elements of nationalism (Bora, 2003, p. 445-
6). For instance, Islam was not emphasized in ‘Nine Lights’4 of Türkeş until 1972 
(Çetinsaya, 1999, p. 371). Members of Ülkücü Movement were also influenced by ideas 
of similar intellectuals as imam-hatip students were. As a matter of fact, most members 
of the movement were graduates of imam-hatips.   
Architects of TIS aimed to create a depoliticized Turkish-Islamic culture, which 
was expected to consolidate stability in the state. Within TIS, it was stressed that secular 
nationalism had deficiencies to create correlation between citizens and the state, and 
this was resulted in rise of leftist ideologies and disorder within country. In this regard, 
Islam was introduced as the key factor for engagements of citizenship, nationalism and 
the state. In other words, ideology of the military coup aimed at reinterpreting the 
relationship between the state and religion in such a way  that religion was used as the 
essence of culture and social control (Altunışık, 2005, p. 48). This is why Şen (2011, p. 
60) underlines the dominance of religion: “…in the synthesis the dominant element is 
Islamism rather than nationalism”. In order to create a common ideology in Turkey, TIS 
aimed at achieving solidarity between conservatives and Turkish nationalists, gathering 
all ethnic groups in Turkey under the umbrella of Turkish nationalism (Aslan, 2014, p. 
524). Islamic-Ottoman heritage was recalled. However, it should be noted that TIS is a 
form of ideologized Islam that is not based on Quran but formed on the basis of the idea 
of return to Turkish culture. It was controlled by the state. As Rabasa and Larrabee 
pointed; although Turkey was defined as a secular state in 1982 Constitution formed by 
the military regime, the role of religion was strengthened in schools and education as a 
means of reinforcing Turkish nationalism, which tended to weaken the emphasis on 
secularism (Rabasa and Larrabee, 2008, p. 38). As a result, Islamists, who were the least 
affected political group from military coup, found chance to disseminate their 
ideologies.  
Golden Years of TIS: 1980 to 2015 
                                                     
4 Nine Lights were formulated by Alpaslan Türkeş. Nine Lights are nine core principles of nationalist discourse 
including nationalism, idealism, moralism, scientism, communitarianism, supporting villagers, independence and 
personalism, populism, and supporting industrial and technical developments.  
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As a result of Islam’s gradual infiltration to the state, more Islamically-oriented elite 
entered to the higher echelons of government, economy, and culture, and they 
influenced not only state policies, but also the articulation of Turkish national identity 
(Waxman, 2000, p. 16). In 1983, the State Planning Organization prepared a report 
stating that the corruption of Turkish moral and cultural values were caused by 
‘divisive foreign ideologies’, and resulted in internal disorder (Atasoy, 2009, p. 93). 
Moreover, it is alleged that secular nationalism caused the removal of Islam, which 
constituted cultural links between Kurds and Turks. Therefore, separatist movement 
among Kurds increased (Atasoy, 2009, p. 96) and leftist movements rose. It was duty of 
the state to protect national culture against foreign ideologies and empower the national 
unity. Islam was referred as a consolidative factor. As a result, Ottoman and Islamic 
legacy rather than the republican one was pointed as the main component of national 
identity. According to Atasoy (2009, p. 96), in this sense, TIS presents a neo-Ottoman 
notion of state building in terms of a historical continuity between Islamic-Ottoman 
heritage, Kemalism and Turkish nationalism. This can be seen both during the 1980s 
and the 2000s. 
Cadres of new right parties and Islamist movements were pioneering groups 
especially after military coup in 1980. Compared to leftist overtone led by Ali Shariati in 
Iran, Islamism developed along with free market and neoliberalism in Turkey in the 
1980s (Turam, 2007, p. 49). Turgut Özal played an important role in intersection of TIS 
and neoliberalism.  
…Özal united and symbolized the main features of both neoliberalism and 
Turkish Islamism…the Motherland Party under his leadership was 
committed to the authoritarian policies of the military regime, 
enthusiastically pursued strong neoliberal policies, promoted religious-
conservative values in politics and culture, and enlarged the religious field 
(Şen, 2011, p. 67).   
Under Motherland Party rule, the network of imam-hatips was again expanded, their 
curriculum changed to include inculcation of the TIS, and the mosque building 
programme was continued (Hale and Özbudun, 2010, p. xxi). Özal was epitomizing the 
synthesis of religion and nationalism. As a right-wing politician, he defined Islam as an 
essential element of Turkish identity:  
2016, 3(1): 171-189 
 
 (178) 
Nail Elhan 
What holds together, or rather brings together, our unity and our 
cohesiveness is the fact that we are all citizens of the Turkish Republic. This 
is the first point. Everybody who lives in this land, everybody who was 
born here and everybody within the boundaries of the Turkish Republic 
who is a citizen of this country is a first-class citizen of this country with no 
distinction being made. Our state is secular. But what holds our nation 
together, what serves in a most powerful way in our national cohesiveness 
and what plays the essential role is Islam (Waxman, 2000, p. 17).  
Reference to TIS continues in the 2000s during AKP rule. AKP opposes to idea of being 
an Islamist party (Yavuz, 2004, p. 227).  Instead, it defines itself as a conservative 
democracy. This is because of tensions between secular institutions and Islamist parties. 
It has never openly presented an anti-Kemalist or anti-laik stance. Rather, it transformed 
the state: 
The AKP flourishes in relation to its political renegotiation of the Kemalist 
political order through an Islamic resignification of cultural issues. It 
challenges the authoritarian fundamentals of the state, but without being 
overtly religious and without shattering the laik foundation of the 
modernity project (Atasoy, 2009, p. 9).   
Armstrong (2012, p. 134) defines it as uniqueness of AKP, and points out wedding of a 
popular religious nationalism to real political power. The party refers Islam as the 
cement of nation without making any references to ethnic roots. Abdullah Gül points 
the party’s reference to religion as a common value: 
Turkish people have been practicing religion for centuries. Islam has been 
the cement of this society, which comes from diversified ethnic 
backgrounds (Gül, 2001 quoted in Çınar and Duran, 2008, p. 33). 
It is a kind of ‘Turkish Islam’ that incorporates the wisdom of Sufism with the historical 
experiences of the Republic of Turkey. Turks were practicing Shamanism in pre-Islamic 
period. When they converted to Islam, religious leaders of them, who were called as 
shamans, began to be referred in Islamic terms such as sheiks, babas and velis. However, 
Islam was intertwined to pre-Islamic faith and native culture. This symbiosis produced 
Sufi orders such as Yeseviyye, Mevleviyye, Bektaşiyye and Nakşibendiyye, and figures such 
as Mawlana, Ahmet Yesevi, Yunus Emre, Hacı Bektaş-ı Veli and Bahattin Nakşibend 
(Yavuz, 2004, p. 219).  Turkish Islam is based on this Sufi tradition and its conflictual 
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relation with orthodox interpretations of Islam. Within this context, Sufi figures of 
Ahmet Yesevi, Mawlana, Yunus Emre and Hacı Bektaş-ı Veli became the mystical 
characters, which prevented Turkish culture from losing out within the Islamic religion 
and provided absorbing of Islamic culture into Turkish one (Yavuz, 2004, p. 219).  
Under AKP rule, Turkish Islam served to continuation of the TIS. The Ottoman 
history is mentioned as a key factor. Islamism and Turco-Ottoman identity forms 
ideological backbone of the party. Erdoğan very often mentions Mehmed the 
Conqueror, Mehmet Akif and Necip Fazıl, who are prominent figures of Ottoman and 
Islamist pasts. Conquest of İstanbul is celebrated as a national holiday on every 29th of 
May in Turkey. AKP has taken such festivities seriously, invoking the nostalgia of pious 
Muslims for the days of glory of the pre-republican, imperial Ottoman Turkey (Çandar, 
2015). Mehmet Akif and Necip Fazıl are defined as poets of the nation, who referred 
nationalism within Islamic tones and values. For Tayyip Erdoğan, Islam has always 
been a very important reference (Heper, 2013, p. 151) and Ottoman times are defined as 
long-awaited period. However, his references throughout ‘age of felicity’ of Prophet 
Mohammad and the first four Caliphs are secondary, while primary historical reference 
point is the Ottoman period, which is perceived as age of peace, tolerance and social 
harmony (Hale and Özbudun, 2010, p. 152). The concept of ‘New Turkey’, which is 
used to refer to AKP rule, aims to strengthen Turkey as it was in Ottoman times. In an 
organization in 2015, Erdoğan was welcomed as ‘the leader’ of ‘New Turkey’, while 
"New Turkey Anthem" was performed by an Ottoman military band, which praised 
Erdoğan. Mentioning historical figures from both Turkish and Islamic periods such as 
Attila the Hun, Oghuz Han, Alpaslan, the Ottoman Empire's founder Osman Ghazi, 
Mehmed the Conqueror, Selim I, Suleiman the Magnificent, Abdulhamid II and 
Atatürk, the band pronounced Erdoğan as one of the leaders (Hürriyet, 2015). Inspired 
also from revival of Ottoman times, TIS under AKP rule exists through education. 
Educational system is converted for the purpose of creating a pious generation. Making 
regulations on educational system, role of imam-hatips is strengthened. Quran and 
Prophet Mohammad’s life are put as elective courses to secondary schools (Açıkgöz, 
2014, p. 51). Courses on Arabic and Ottoman language entered to academic programs of 
schools. Restoration of nation’s roots with their past is aimed: 
Erdogan argued the lessons were necessary to restore Turks' severed ties 
with "our roots", with most unable to read the tombstones of their 
ancestors…It's not a foreign language. It's a form of Turkish that will never 
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age. Therefore it will be taught no matter what they say," he added 
(Telegraph, 2014).  
Turkish-Islamic Synthesis and Symbols on Banknotes5 
Rather than signifying sovereignty or independence of a nation, banknotes also imply 
historical narratives that are influential both in the construction of national identities, 
and, related to this, in implementation of state policies. According to Raento, et al. 
(2004, p. 930), the imaginary of money supports the production and maintenance of a 
national narrative written by the national elite. This historical-national narrative 
includes historical figures, monuments and commemorations. In Turkey, banknotes 
have messages of creation of national identity and providing national unity. For 
instance, banknotes of early Republican Era were designed in order to serve the policies 
of nation building. Usages of wolf pictures referring to pre-Islamic history of Turks, and 
photos from the new capital, Ankara, illustrate this.  
The banknotes used during and after military coup in 1980 and the ones 
designed during AKP rule in 2009 have also messages. Admiration for Ottoman past, 
overemphasize on Ottoman culture and art, reinvention of Turkish Islam and eligibility 
of Turkish national identity are explicitly presented in the aforementioned banknotes. 
Within this context, it is claimed that there is a continuity of TIS.   
In Turkey, Central Bank of Republic of Turkey (TCMB) is empowered by the 
Grand National Assembly of Turkey (TBMM) with prerogative of coining money. This 
is stated in Article 87 of the Constitution. Themes and symbols on the banknotes are 
determined by the Council of Bank. These themes and symbols are selected from a 
repository, which includes alternative themes and symbols such as prominent Turkish 
figures, scientists and philosophers, Anatolian civilizations, national palaces, and 
natural beauties.    
During the period between 1980 and 2009, three series of banknotes were used in 
Turkey: the Seventh Issue (E7) Banknotes between 1979 and 2006, the Eight Issue (E8) 
Banknotes between 2005 and 2010, and the Ninth Issue (E9) Banknotes from 2009 until 
                                                     
5 While studying on this article, I had a private correspondence with Central Bank of Republic of Turkey (TCMB) 
(Date: 28.01.2016, No: 01427). In this part of this article, I will benefit from this correspondence. 
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today.6 Dominant figure in banknotes is Atatürk. All obverse sides consist of his 
portraits. 
E7 is the longest series of banknotes to be used in Turkey. First denomination of 
this series began to be issued in 1979 and withdrawn in 2006. In this respect, E7 Series 
witnessed to several events that have important roles in Turkish political history such 
as the military coup in 1980, rise of separatist movements, increasing demand of 
democratization, rise of Islamic movements, and the military ‘intimidation’ on February 
28th of 1997. As it is mentioned in the part on the TIS, rise of leftist ideologies, increasing 
influence of revolutionary Islamist ideas related to Iranian Revolution in 1979 and, 
related to these, disorder within country highlighted the need for a state-led religion. As 
a result, synthesis of Turkish-Islam emerged as a key factor to weaken leftist and 
Islamist movements, and to restore national order. TIS was introduced as an acceptable 
‘state Islam’. It was also aimed to keep non-conforming Islams as potential threats to the 
secular regime. In this period, heritage left by Ottomans and Islamic culture was 
enshrined. Role of Islam in politics increased in such a way that Turkey joined to the 
Fourth Islamic Summit Conference at presidential level in 1984 for the first time. Even, 
Kenan Evren, the leader of military coup, was elected as director for economic 
committee in this conference (Eligür, 2010, p. 134). Passion to the glorious periods of 
Ottoman history and İstanbul’s culture, nostalgia to the era of Mehmet II and conquest 
of İstanbul, admiration to Turkish-Islamic culture and arts were on the peak of 
glorification (Çetinsaya, 1999, p. 370).  
 
 
                                                     
6 Due to differences between dates of issue and dates of withdrawal, when a new series of banknotes issued, the 
former one maintained to be used for a while. For instance, when E9 series were issued in 2009, E8 series maintained 
to be used until 2010. 
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 Banknotes were issued in the 
service of TIS. Islamic designs and 
themes are located on the reverse 
sides of the banknotes.  A portrait of 
Mehmet Akif, his house in Ankara, 
which is currently used as a museum, 
a view from Ankara Castle, and the 
script of the first two quatrains of 
National Anthem are designed 
themes on 100-Turkish Lira (Figure 
1), which were used between 1983 and 1989. On 1000-Turkish Lira, a portrait of Mehmet 
II and a view from İstanbul were designed (Figure 2). This banknote was used between 
1986 and 1992. On-5000 Turkish Lira, which were used between 1981 and 1994, a figure 
of Mawlana and Mawlana Museum in Konya was designed (Figure 3, Figure 4). These 
banknotes were issued with two different designs. On 10000-Turkish Lira, a figure of 
Mimar Sinan and one of his 
architectures, Selimiye Mosque in 
Edirne, were designed (Figure 5). It 
was used from 1982 to 1995. These 
were the first people, whose portraits 
were designed on the banknotes after 
the ones of Atatürk and İsmet İnönü. 
Islamic designs and themes on these 
banknotes such as a mosque, a tomb, 
an Islamist philosopher, whirling 
dervishes and a Sufi figure, an 
Ottoman sultan and an Ottoman architect, represent the state-controlled Islamization 
policy, or the TIS. References to the ‘magnificent’ Turkish-Ottoman past, Turkish Islam, 
Ottoman art and culture are pointed through banknotes in the 1980s.7 In other words, 
messages and policies of the ruling elite coincide on designs of banknotes.     
   
 
                                                     
7 Of course, these four kinds of banknotes were not the only banknotes issued in E7 Series. I decided on these, 
because of their connection to topic of this article.  
Figure 1 
 (www.worldbanknotescoins.com)  
Figure 2 
(www.worldbanknotescoins.com)  
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E9 Series of banknotes were issued in 
20098 and it brought along debates 
about who the figures on banknotes 
were. Even it was discussed in daily 
newspapers that whether AKP 
declared sharia rule (Bayer, 2009). In 
my private correspondence with 
TCMB, it explained the criteria in 
determination of figures on banknotes: 
to be a scientist or an artist, to be 
‘indigenous’ i.e. one of our own, to 
have a universal recognition, not to be 
identified with any political ideology, 
not to be issued on previous banknotes 
both in Turkey and in the world. In 
this regard, any changes on designs of 
banknotes in future are up to these 
criteria.  
E9 Series with renewed designs 
and portraits have been put into circulation 
on January 1, 2009, in six different values 
consisting of denominations 5, 10, 20, 
50, 100 and 200 Turkish Liras (CBRT, 
2014, 13). In these banknotes, neo-
Ottomanism, contributions of Turks to 
the science, and Turkish-Islamic 
culture and art are the dominant 
themes.  
On 5-Turkish Lira banknote, 
there is a portrait of Prof. Dr. Aydın 
Sayılı, who has the first doctoral degree in 
the field of history of science in the world 
                                                     
8 In 2005, E8 Series of banknotes began to be used until their withdrawal in 2010. Since almost the same figures were 
used with E7 Series, E8 Series will not be discussed in this article. 
Figure 3 
(www.turkishbanknotes.info)  
Figure 4 
(www.worldbanknotescoins.com)  
 
Figure 5 
(www.worldbanknotescoins.com)  
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(Unat, 2013, p. 2-3), with symbols about the solar system, atomic model and DNA 
model (Figure 6). His thesis was on scientific developments in the medieval Islamic 
world. Graduated from Harvard University in 1942, Sayılı is a pioneer of establishment 
of history of science discipline in Turkey. Similarly, a portrait of another Turkish 
scientist, Cahit Arf, is designed on 10-Turkish Lira banknote. In addition to Arf’s 
portrait, an equation of his theory, Arf Invariant, is located on the banknotes (Figure 7). 
Portrayal of both Sayılı and Arf together with scientific symbols on banknotes refers to 
Turkish-Islamic advancements and contributions of Turks in science.  
Rather than 5 and 
10 Lira banknotes, 
reference to Ottoman past 
is emphasized more 
clearly on 20, 50, 100 and 
200-lira banknotes. On 
20-Turkish Lira banknote, 
a portrait of Architect 
Kemaleddin and one of 
his projects, Rectorate 
Building of Gazi 
University in Ankara, are 
designed (Figure 8). 
Kemaleddin was an Ottoman architect, but also worked during early republican years. 
He was one of the pioneers of First National Architectural Movement, which is also 
called as neo-Ottomanist architecture (Balamir, 2003). This movement had a critical 
approach against republican period. Republican elite made a clear distinction between 
the Ottoman period and afterwards. In this regard, public figures such as Mimar Sinan 
were highlighted in the field of architecture and Ottoman sultans were de-emphasized. 
With the increasing influence of modernization and Westernization policies, secular 
buildings such as barracks and schools became the favorite architectures of new 
republic.   Kemaleddin opposes to this understanding of republican period and accuses 
the traceries during this period as being non-national. His movement aims to replace 
secularism with Turkishness and Islam in the field of architecture. According to him, 
Turkish architecture is genuine and composed of Turkish spirit and Muslim civilization 
(Tekeli and İlkin, 1997, p. 14). 
Figure 6 
(www.banknotes.com)  
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The first woman figure on 
banknotes in the history of the 
republic is issued during AKP 
rule in 2009. A portrait of one of 
the first novelists in Turkish 
literature, Fatma Aliye, with 
several figures of book, pen, 
inkstand and paper are designed 
on 50-Turkish Lira banknotes 
(Figure 9). Fatma Aliye was 
daughter of Ahmet Cevdet Pasha, 
a dignitary Ottoman pasha, and 
wife of Faik Bey, nephew of 
prominent commander of Battle 
of Plevne, Gazi Osman Pasha. In 
her literal works, she was 
interested in women rights, 
education of women, marriage and women’s place in society. While emphasizing 
equality of women and men, she 
stayed in the frame of traditional 
values. She opposed to state-led 
modernization and 
Westernization policies of 
Kemalist elite during republican 
period, and criticized new 
republic’s sharp distinction with 
Ottoman past. In her novel, Uzak 
Ülke, discussing Fatma Aliye’s 
life, Fatma Barbarosoğlu (2010, p. 159) points Aliye’s critics on modernization policies 
and de-emphasize of Ottoman 
past:  
…what unifies the whole was gone, and thereby the unity was dissolved. 
Path to be followed is clear: to prepare the future without destroying the 
Figure 7 
(www.banknotes.com)  
 
Figure 8 
(www.banknotes.com)  
 
Figure 9 
(www.istanbulkadınmuzesi.org)  
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past. Not ignoring, but benefiting from it. I wish they (the Kemalist elite) 
knew the difference between demolition of the Sultan and demolition of the 
past. I wish they accept the close relationship between the past and the 
future.  
Designs of 100 and 200-Lira banknotes have also direct references to Turkish-Islamic 
arts, Ottoman past and Turkish Islam. On 100-Turkish Lira banknotes, there is a portrait 
of Ottoman musician Buhurizade 
Mustafa Efendi, known as Itri 
(Figure 10). Beside this, figures of 
musical notes, several 
instruments and a portrait of a 
dervish playing reed flute are 
designed on banknotes. Portrait 
of dervish playing reed flute 
refers to Itri’s devotion to 
Mavleviyeh, a religious order based on ideas of Mawlana. Itri was a musician 
supported by Ottoman sultans. 
Today, it is claimed that he is one 
of the composers contributed to developments of Turkish classical music. On 200-
Turkish Lira, there is a portrait of Yunus Emre, the prominent Sufi and poet, is designed 
(Figure 11). In addition, there are several figures accompanying his portrait: a figure of 
his mausoleum, a figure of rose, which is usually included in his poems, a figure of 
pigeon, which symbolizes peace 
and brotherhood, and one of his 
verses, which is ‘Sevelim Sevilelim’ 
means ‘let love and be loved’. 
Influenced by Mawlana, Yunus 
Emre points the non-indulgence. 
Only if one is self-denial, the love of 
God can be achieved.  According to 
him, all humankinds are equal in 
front of the God without giving 
attention to their ethnicity, religion 
and sect. Issuing of Itri and Yunus Emre directly refers to Ottoman-Islamic past and 
Figure 10 
(www.dreamstime.com)      
Figure 11 
(www.worldbanknotescoins.com) 
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Turkish Islam, which are mostly mentioned by AKP cadres. For example, Erdoğan 
sums up his worldview with a verse of Yunus Emre, which is ‘Yaradılanı Severiz, 
Yaradandan Ötürü’ meaning ‘we love the creatures, due to the Creator’, within a Turkish 
Islamic context. In addition, AKP cadres encourage people to learn about Ottoman past, 
which is defined as a necessity.  
Conclusion 
To conclude, there is a continuity of state-religion relationship in the history of Turkey. 
TIS is a product of this relationship emerged in the 1960s and evolved to a de facto state 
policy in 1980 military coup. It maintains to exist during AKP rule in the 2000s. This 
continuity is concluded within symbols issued on banknotes in these years.  
It is clear that the first banknotes issued by the early republic show parallelisms 
with the ones used today in terms of representing ideologies of ruling political elite and 
carrying messages about policies of the state. However, it is controversial to claim that 
there is an established tradition about banknote issuing in Turkey. When the series 
issued from the 1920s until today are analyzed, it is clear that there is no parallelism in 
terms of banknotes’ usage as political instruments and messages out of several 
banknotes and series. Only the banknotes issued during Atatürk period, and the ones 
issued in the early 1980s and under AKP rule clearly have political messages related to 
political agenda of ruling elites.  
Banknotes issued in the early 1980s and 2009, which are subjects of this article, 
have continuity in terms of TIS. As usage of figures from Ottoman-Turkish and Islamic 
past demonstrates, symbols and figures issued on these banknotes have direct 
references to TIS. Although the TCMB defines five criteria on determination of symbols 
on banknotes in E9 Series, it is debatable. These five criteria are to be a scientist or an 
artist, to be ‘indigenous’ i.e. one of our own, to be universally recognized, not to be 
identified with any political ideology, and not to be issued on previous banknotes both 
in Turkey and in the world. Adnan Sayılı and Cahit Arf are scientists that were not 
issued on banknotes before. Thus, their selection makes sense in terms of five criteria of 
TCMB. As one of the prominent architects in Turkish history, selection of Mimar 
Kemaleddin can be defined as just that Mimar Sinan has already issued on E7 Banknote 
Series.  However, issuing of Fatma Aliye, Itri and Yunus Emre are controversial in 
terms of these criteria, one of which was not to be identified with any political ideology. 
Fatma Aliye is known for her Islamist ideas. Itri and Yunus Emre are prominent figures 
of Turkish Islam. It is doubtful that they are used in accordance with political rhetoric of 
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AKP. It is unmoral to refer Fatma Aliye, Itri and Yunus Emre as representatives of a 
political ideology. But what about their usage as instruments of a political party’s 
rhetoric?   
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